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JURISDICTION
Plaintiffs and appellants (hereafter collectively referred to as the "Dimicks")
appeal a final order of the Seventh District Court, Carbon County, State of Utah, granting
defendant and appellee OHC Liquidation Trust's Motion for Summary Judgment.1 The
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782-2(4) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE #1: Did the trial court correctly determine that there were no genuine
issues as to any material fact and that Oakwood was entitled to judgment in its favor as a
matter of law where the Dimicks failed to raise a dispute as to any material fact and
offered only the bare allegation of a defect in the Oakwood home and no evidence that
their alleged injuries were proximately caused by a defect in the home?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In considering a trial court's grant of summary
judgment, this Court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness. Bums v.
Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 418 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994). This issue was
preserved in the trial court. (R. 291, 302, 380, 455-456).
ISSUE #2: Did the Dimicks' failure to object to the trial court's consideration of

J

The OHC Liquidation Trust (hereafter "Oakwood") is the successor in interest to
Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., a former North Carolina corporation, Oakwood Shared
Services, LLC, a former Delaware corporation; and HBOS Manufacturing, LP (f/k/a
Homes By Oakwood, Inc.)(f/k/a Schult Homes Corporation).
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the "HUD Compliance Assurance Inspection Form" and failure to argue to the trial court
that the home violated government standards thereby preclude appellate review of these
arguments?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court will not consider arguments raised for
the first time on appeal. Coombs v. Juice Works Development, Inc., 2003 UT App 388 fn
3; 81 P.3d 769. In the proceedings below, the Dimicks did not object to the trial court's
consideration of the "HUD Compliance Assurance Inspection Form" and did not argue
that the home failed to comply with applicable government standards. The trial court did
not consider or rule upon these issues, the issues were not preserved for appeal, and there
is no decision for this Court to review.
ISSUE #3: Did the trial court properly treat Oakwood's motion for summary
judgment as a motion for judgment on all of the Dimicks' claims, rather than a motion for
partial summary judgment, where Oakwood's motion specifically requested judgment in
its favor as to all claims asserted by the Dimicks and the Dimicks had a full and fair
opportunity to oppose the motion?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In considering a trial court's grant of summary
judgment, this Court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness. Burns v.
Cannondale Bicycle Co.. 876 P.2d 415, 418 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994). This issue was
preserved in the trial court. (R. 291, 302, 380, 455-456).
ISSUE #4: Did the trial court correctly certify as final the judgment in favor of
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Oakwood where the judgment completely disposed of Oakwood as a party, the judgment
would have been immediately appealable but for the existence of other parties in the
action, and the trial court determined that there was no just cause for delay?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The question of whether an order is eligible for
certification under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) is a question of law that an appellate court
reviews for correctness. Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n., 814 P.2d 1099,
1100 (Utah 1991). This issue was preserved in the trial court. (R. 609).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES,
AND REGULATIONS
STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6:
In any action for damages for personal injury, death, or property
damage allegedly caused by a defect in a product:
(1)

No product shall be considered to have a defect or to be in a
defective condition, unless at the time the product was sold by
the manufacturer or other initial seller, there was a defect or
defective condition in the product which made the product
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.

(2)

As used in this act, "unreasonably dangerous" means that the
product was dangerous to an extent beyond which would be
contemplated by the ordinary and prudent buyer, consumer or
user of that product in that community considering the
product's characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers and uses
together with any actual knowledge, training, or experience
possessed by that particular buyer, user or consumer.

(3)

There is a rebuttable presumption that a product is free from
any defect or defective condition where the alleged defect in
-3-

the plans or designs for the product or the methods and
techniques of manufacturing, inspecting and testing the
product were in conformity with government standards
established for that industry which were in existence at the
time the plans or designs for the product or the methods and
techniques of manufacturing, inspecting and testing the
product were adopted.
RULES
Utah R. Civ. P. 56:
(b)
For defending party. A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought,
may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof.
(c)
Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion,
memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment
sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of
damages.
Utah R. Civ. P. 54:
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple
parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action,
whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or
when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only
upon an express determination by the court that there is no just reason for
delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the
absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of
decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or
the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the
action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of
decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment
-4-

adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE: The Dimicks assert claims for wrongful death and
personal injury against Oakwood and various other parties. The claims arise out of the
death of Cathleen Dimick ("Cathleen") and personal injuries sustained by Christopher
Dimick ("Christopher") after both were infected with hantavirus. The Dimicks claim that
on March 11, 2000, Cathleen and Christopher were simultaneously exposed to hantavirus
while touring an Oakwood manufactured home at the Happy Homes sales lot in Helper,
Utah.
Happy Homes ordered this particular Oakwood home from Oakwood in May 1998.
Oakwood then manufactured and delivered the home to Happy Homes sales lot in Helper,
Utah in June 1998. Happy Homes then tendered payment for the home to Oakwood.
When Christopher and Cathleen toured the home at the sales lot in March 2000, the home
had been sitting on the lot (essentially an open field) for nearly two years. In those two
years, the owners and operators of the sales lot showed the home to prospective
purchasers countless times.
Christopher contracted to purchase the home the same day he toured it. Happy
Homes subsequently delivered the home to Christopher's property in Price, Utah in May
2000.
The Dimicks assert that on May 27, 2000, Cathleen fell ill with hantavirus and
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died three days later. They further assert that on May 30, 2000, Christopher also fell ill
with hantavirus and as a result sustained permanent injuries.
Two years later, on April 11, 2002, the Dimicks filed suit against Oakwood, as
well as the owners and operators of the home sales lot. The Dimicks subsequently
amended their complaint three times, filing with the trial court a First Amended
Complaint, Second Amended Complaint, and a Third Amended Complaint. However, the
Dimicks only served copies of the First and Second Amended Complaints to the
defendant parties, including Oakwood. The Dimicks' Second Amended Complaint
asserted the following causes of action against all defendants: strict products liability;
breach of implied warranty (fitness); breach of warranty (merchantability); breach of
express warranty; negligent failure to warn; and premises liability.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: On October 14, 2004, over two years after the
Dimicks filed suit, Oakwood filed a motion for summary judgment on all of the Dimicks'
claims. After two years of discovery, during which the parties exchanged and answered
written interrogatories, requests for admission, requests for production of documents, as
and deposed several witnesses, the Dimicks produced no evidence to support their claims
against Oakwood. Oakwood's motion argued that because there were no genuine
disputes as to any material fact, and because Oakwood was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law, the trial court should enter summary judgment in favor of Oakwood on all
of the Dimicks' claims. In particular, Oakwood argued that the Dimicks failed to produce
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any evidence of a defect in the home, no evidence the home was "unreasonably
dangerous," and no evidence that a defect in the home proximately caused their injuries,
and therefore, under Utah law, the Dimicks could not sustain their claims against
Oakwood.
The Dimicks opposed Oakwood's motion. They argued that they had produced
evidence of a defect in the Oakwood home sufficient to defeat Oakwood's motion, and
they further asserted that Oakwood's motion should be treated as a motion for partial
summary judgment on only the Dimicks' strict products liability theory.
In reply, Oakwood pointed out that the Dimicks had failed to create a dispute as to
any material fact. Oakwood also argued that the Dimicks had failed to present any
evidence of a defect in the Oakwood home. Furthermore, the Dimicks did not rebut the
statutory presumption that the home was free of defects by virtue of its compliance with
government standards. Finally, the Dimicks failed to offer any evidence that a defect in
the home proximately caused their alleged injuries. Because the Dimicks failed to meet
their evidentiary burden under Utah law, Oakwood argued that all of the Dimicks claims
against Oakwood failed as a matter of law.
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT: On February 28, 2005, the Seventh
District Court, the Honorable Bruce K. Halliday presiding, heard oral argument on
Oakwood's motion for summary judgment and took it under advisement. In a
memorandum decision dated April 14, 2005, the trial court granted Oakwood's motion
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and directed counsel for Oakwood to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Oakwood then prepared proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Utah R.
Civ. P. 54(b) Certification of Final Judgment and served a copy to the Dimicks' counsel.
The Dimicks filed an objection thereto.
On July 29, 2005, the trial court signed Oakwood's proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and certified the judgment as final pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b).
On August 25, 2005, on its own accord, the trial court vacated the July 29, 2005 judgment
in order to allow for oral argument of the Dimicks' objections to Oakwood's proposed
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) Certification of Final
Judgment. On September 23, 2005, the Seventh District Court, the Honorable Bruce K.
Halliday presiding, heard oral argument on the Dimicks' objections. Following oral
arguments, the trial court again entered Oakwood's Proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) Certification of Final Judgment as
submitted. The Dimicks appealed.
RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S FACTUAL STATEMENT
The "Factual Statement" found on pages 8-11 of the Dimicks' Appellate Brief is
taken nearly verbatim from their Memorandum in Opposition to the Oakwood
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 381-383). In the proceedings below,
the Dimicks did not dispute the "Statement of Undisputed Material Facts" in Oakwood's
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment,
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as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B). Instead, the Dimicks provided a separate
statement of facts. Oakwood responded to the Dimicks' statement in its Reply
Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and demonstrated that no
factual disputes actually existed. Oakwood's responses to the Dimicks' statements are
reproduced here to assist the Court in reviewing the Dimicks' "Factual Statement." (R.
450-453). Oakwood also directs the Court's attention to Oakwood's "Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts" contained in its Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and the trial court's Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) Certification of Final Judgment. (R. 299301, 621).2
1.

Appellee-manufacturer, Oakwood Homes, owned the manufactured home

at issue as it sat on the Happy Homes sales lot in Helper, Utah. The title to each
manufactured home is held by a finance company until each home is sold to consumer(s).
(Record on Appeal (hereinafter "R."), at 381, 390-391, 424-425).
RESPONSE: This statement is not supported by evidence in the record. Happy
Homes owned the home while it sat on their lot: it is undisputed that "after returning the
final confirmation of its home order to [Oakwood], Happy Homes tendered payment to
Schult for [the Dimick home]." (Record on Appeal (hereinafter "R.") 299, 314).

2

A copy of the trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Utah R. Civ.
P. 54(b) Certification of Final Judgment is attached hereto as Addendum #1.
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Furthermore, the deposition testimony cited by the Dimicks does not support the
statement. Neither Mary Musgrave nor Robert Hoggatt testified that the specific home
purchased by Christopher Dimick from Happy Homes was owned by Oakwood while it
sat on the Happy Homes lot. Ms. Musgrave's cited testimony speaks to general financing
arrangements for manufactured homes rather than the specific financing of the Dimick
Home, and Mr. Hoggatt only testified as to how Lifestyle Homes did business, not Happy
Homes (the entity that actually sold the home to Christopher Dimick). (R. 390-391, 424425).
2.

When the home manufactured by Oakwood was delivered to the Happy

Homes sales lot in Helper, Utah, it had 30-50 holes in the underside and exterior walls.
The holes were at least large enough for a piece of conduit to fit through. (R. at 382-384,
398-402).
RESPONSE: The statement is incomplete. To support this statement, the
Dimicks rely on deposition testimony of John Schram, the Happy Homes employee that
set-up the home on Happy Homes sales lot. Mr. Schram testified that generally speaking
there may have been 30 to 50 penetrations for piping, utility, and venting connections in
the floor and walls of a manufactured home, however the penetrations were often caulked
with foam and were not exposed to the elements. Specifically, Mr. Schram testified:
Q:

[By Mr. Booke] A little while ago you were talking about the
penetrations that are sometimes put in the modular homes for
plumbing and other reasons?
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A:

[By Mr. Schram] Uh-huh.

Q:

Did you caulk those holes as a part of patching up the holes or did
you put caulk in the holes that were already there for plumbing or
other reasons, electrical?

A:

The factory puts their plumbing and electrical through the holes and
I'm not sure if they caulk or put like foam, the expanding foam. I
think they do in some instances put the expanding foam around the
pipes where they penetrate.

Q:

Did you?

A:

No, I didn't. Those penetrating holes were inaccessible to me
because they are under the belly paper in the floor of the home and
they are unaccessible to me once the home is completed, except
penetrations in the paper, I would repair penetrations in the paper.

Q:

So after the home is received and placed up on the jacks, if you were
to crawl underneath and you are looking at the belly paper could you
see where the holes were?

A:

No.

(R. 398-402, 468-469). Additionally, Mr. Schram testified that penetrations in the
external walls of the home did not run through to the interior walls of the home. (R. 401402).
3.

When homes manufactured by the Oakwood Appellee were delivered to the

Happy Homes sales lot in Helper, there were quite often rips and tears in the "belly
paper" that was intended to cover and seal the underside of the homes. (R. at 382, 404409). These rips were so common that the manufacturer regularly provided rolls of
replacement belly paper. (R. at 382, 406-407).
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RESPONSE: This statement is not supported by evidence in the record. Again,
the Dimicks rely on testimony from John Schram. Mr. Schram did not testify to any rips
and tears in the "belly paper" of the Dimick home in particular or any Oakwood home in
general, and Mr. Schram did not testify that Oakwood regularly provided rolls of belly
paper to Happy Homes. Instead, Mr. Schram testified as to his experience with setting up
"approximately 400 homes" from various manufacturers. (R. 406-407, 464, 469). Mr.
Schram testified that he did not recall any rips or tears in the belly paper of the home sold
to Christopher Dimick. (R. 468-469). There is no evidence of a rip or tear in the belly
paper of the home sold to Christopher Dimick.
4.

John Schram, an employee of the sales lot in Helper, testified in deposition

that the 30-50 penetrations in the underside and exterior walls of the manufactured home
were for piping and venting and that the holes were sometimes caulked:
Q:

[By Mr. Booke, Appellants' counsel] A little while ago you were
talking about the penetrations that were sometimes put in the
modular homes for plumbing and other reasons?

A:

[By Mr. Schram] Uh-huh.

Q:

Did you caulk those holes as part of patching up the holes or did you
put caulk in the holes that were already there for plumbing or other
reasons, electrical?

A:

The factory puts their plumbing and electrical through the holes and
I'm not sure I they caulk or put like foam, the expanding foam. I
think they do in some instances put the expanding foam around the
pipes where they penetrate.

(R. at 451, 468-469).
-12-

RESPONSE: The statement is misleading. Mr. Schram testified that he did not
know the number of penetrations in the sub-flooring of the Dimick home. (R. 399). Mr.
Schram estimated that there may be 30 to 50 penetrations in that type of home, but the
penetrations were not accessible to him. (R. 468-469).
5.

John Schram also testified that interior insulation could be seen through the

penetrations in the exterior walls. (R. at 399-401, 464-465).
RESPONSE: The statement is incomplete and misleading. Mr. Schram also
testified that exterior wall penetrations did not run through to interior walls. (R. 464466). Moreover, Mr. Schram did not testify that he saw interior insulation through any
penetration in an exterior wall of the home sold to Christopher Dimick. (R. 464-466).
Importantly, no witness, including the Dimicks, testified that they observed unsealed or
uncaulked penetrations in the Dimick home.
6.

Oakwood knew that manufactured homes shipped to Happy Homes were

displayed in a lot that was in an open field. There was no means of preventing access by
deer mice in the field where the homes were displayed. (R. at 382, 384, 411-413).
RESPONSE: This statement is false and not supported by evidence in the record.
The citations offered to support this alleged fact offer no such support. While the
evidence in the record indicates that Oakwood knew that the home purchased by Happy
Homes was to be delivered to Happy Homes sales lot in Helper, Utah, there is no
evidence that Oakwood had any knowledge of the conditions of the Happy Homes lot.
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(R. 326-328). Furthermore, Mary Musgrave did not testify that there was "no means of
preventing" deer mice from accessing the Happy Homes lot; rather, she testified that
Happy Homes did not implement measures to prevent deer mice from accessing the lot.
(R. 413-415).
7.

It has long been well known in the Price/Helper area that deer mice are

carriers of Hantavirus. (R. 382, 384, 417-419, 421-425).
RESPONSE: This statement is overbroad and not supported by evidence in the
record. Mr. Hoggatt and Ms. Musgrave merely testified as to their individual knowledge
of the hantavirus and offered no testimony as to whether the cause of hantavirus "has long
been well known in the Price/Helper area." (R. 417-419, 421-425).
8.

On March 11, 2000, Reid Dimick, Cathy Dimick and Chris Dimick went

into a home, manufactured by Oakwood, that was sitting on the Happy Homes sales lot in
Helper, Utah. While looking in a bedroom closet, they saw deer mice nestings and
droppings. (R. at 382, 385, 427-434, 436).
RESPONSE: This allegation was disputed in the trial court, however it was not
material to the trial court's ruling on Oakwood's Motion for Summary Judgment.
9.

On May 27, 2000, Cathy Dimick became violently ill with Hantavirus. She

died within three days of the onset of her final illness. Three days after Cathy's death,
Chris became violently ill with Hantavirus. He is now permanently disabled as a result of
the Hantavirus. (R. at 382-383, 385, 438-444).
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RESPONSE: This allegation was not material to the trial court's ruling on
Oakwood's Motion for Summary Judgment.
10.

Reid Dimick knows of no Hantavirus exposure that Cathy and Chris could

both have suffered, except for their simultaneous exposure in Oakwood's manufactured
home on the Happy Homes sales lot on March 11, 2000. (R. at 383, 385, 446-448).
RESPONSE: This allegation was disputed in the trial court, however it was not
material to the trial court's ruling on Oakwood's Motion for Summary Judgment.
11.

Oakwood argued to the trial court "They (the homes) have penetrations in

them. Those penetrations are signed off by HUD. They're part of a checklist the
government has said cNot a problem,' which creates the presumption that this home was
free of defects." (Oral Argument Hr'g. Tr. 16:11-14, February 28, 2005).
RESPONSE: Oakwood's argument is supported by evidence in the record and the
Dimicks offered no evidence to refute it. Specifically, the "HUD Compliance Assurance
Inspection Form" for the Dimick home contains a line-item that reads: "Bottom Board
Sealed & Repaired to Prevent Rodent Access". Both halves of the Dimick home
complied with this requirement. (R. 333, 337). The Dimicks offered no evidence that the
Dimick home failed to comply with any government standard.
12.

The checklist on which Oakwood relied is silent as to penetrations in the

home. (R. at 331-338).
RESPONSE: This statement is false. The "HUD Compliance Assurance
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Inspection Form" applicable to the Dimick home contains a line-item that reads: "Bottom
Board Sealed & Repaired to Prevent Rodent Access". Both halves of the Dimick home
complied with this requirement. (R. 333, 337).
13.

The trial court admitted the checklist as evidence, without affidavits

demonstrating any evidentiary foundation for or describing the use of, the document.
(Oral Argument Hr'g. Tr. 5:18-24, February 28, 2005).
RESPONSE: Oakwood's Motion for Summary Judgment cited the "HUD
Compliance Assurance Inspection Form" for the Dimick home and it was attached as an
exhibit to Oakwood's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion
for Summary Judgment. (R. 299, 330-337). The Dimicks did not raise in their opposing
memorandum any objection to the HUD inspection form.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
First, this Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of Oakwood on all of the Dimicks' claims because the Dimicks failed to produce
evidence of a defect in the Oakwood home purchased by Christopher Dimick. Instead,
they offered only a bare contention of a defect. Additionally, the Dimicks did not offer
any evidence indicating that the home was unreasonably dangerous nor that their alleged
injuries were proximately caused by a defect in the home. Because the Dimicks failed to
meet their burden, the trial court's judgment in favor of Oakwood should be affirmed.
Second, the Dimicks did not object to the trial court's consideration of the "HUD
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Compliance Assurance Inspection Form" nor did they argue to the trial court that the
home failed to comply with government standards. Accordingly, they failed to preserve
these arguments for appellate review. Substantively, although the Dimicks argue that 24
C.F.R. § 3280.603(b)(6) requires that "[a]ll exterior openings around piping and
equipment shall be sealed to resist the entry of rodents[,]" the Dimicks produced
absolutely no evidence indicating that exterior openings on the Dimick home were not
sealed. This Court should decline to consider these issues because they were raised for
the first time on appeal.
Third, Oakwood did not raise new arguments in its Reply Brief in Support of its
Motion for Summary Judgment. Oakwood's motion requested judgment in its favor on
all of the Dimicks' claims. The Dimicks had a fair and full opportunity to oppose the
motion both by opposing memoranda and oral argument to the trial court. Being fully
advised, the trial court correctly concluded that there was no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and that Oakwood was entitled to judgment in its favor on all of the
Dimicks' claims.
Finally, the trial court properly certified the judgment in favor of Oakwood as final
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). The Dimicks' lawsuit involved multiple claims against
multiple parties. The trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Oakwood
disposed of all claims asserted by the Dimicks against Oakwood; however, the Dimicks'
claims against the other parties remained. Therefore, after concluding there was no just

-17-

reason for delay, the trial court properly certified its judgment in favor of Oakwood as
final pursuant to Rule 54(b).
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DIMICKS FAILED TO OFFER EVIDENCE OF A SPECIFIC
DEFECT THAT RENDERED THE HOME "UNREASONABLY
DANGEROUS" AND FAILED TO OFFER EVIDENCE THAT A
DEFECT PROXIMATELY CAUSED THEIR ALLEGED INJURIES,
THEREFORE THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED
OAKWOOD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The trial court correctly granted Oakwood's motion for summary judgment
because there existed no genuine issue as to any material fact and Oakwood was entitled
to judgment in its favor as a matter of law.3 In the court proceedings below, the Dimicks
offered no evidence of a specific defect in the mobile home that proximately caused their
alleged injuries. The Dimicks simply alleged, without offering any evidentiary support,
that the home was defective due to the supposed existence of 30 to 50 penetrations in the
home. These penetrations in the sub-flooring and exterior are part of the design of the
home allowing for utility connections and venting. There is no evidence in the record that
these penetrations constituted a "defect" under Utah law. Because the Dimicks failed to

3

As a threshold matter, the Dimicks ignored Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B) and failed
to specifically rebut the statement of undisputed material facts set forth in Oakwood
Homes' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion for Summary
Judgment. (R. 381-383). Instead the Dimicks simply offered their own statement of
allegedly disputed material facts. As a result of their failure to follow procedural
requirements, they should not now be allowed to allege the existence of disputed material
facts. A copy of Utah R. Civ. P. 7 is attached as addendum #5 to the Brief of Appellant.
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offer evidence of a defect in the home sufficient to meet their burden under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-15-6(1) and Utah case law, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment
in favor of Oakwood.
The "argument" section of the Dimicks' Memorandum in Opposition to Oakwood
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is just over two pages long, and in those few
pages, the Dimicks contend that Oakwood homes in general are defective because they
allegedly have "30 to 50 pre-drilled holes into specific locations in the bottoms and sides
of the homes." (R. 383-385). The Dimicks cited no authority to support their contention
that these penetrations actually constituted a defect. (R. 383-385). Furthermore, the
Dimicks did not dispute that the home complied with all applicable government standards
as demonstrated by the home's "HUD Compliance Assurance Inspection Form" attached
as Exhibit 4 to Oakwood's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 383-385, 329-337). Because the Dimicks offered
only a bare contention of a defect, the Dimicks could not sustain their claims against
Oakwood and the trial court properly granted Oakwood's motion for summary judgment.
Under Utah law, in order to prevail under a products liability, breach of express or
implied warranty, or negligence theory against Oakwood, the Dimicks were required to
produce evidence of a manufacturing defect in the Oakwood home that rendered it
unreasonably dangerous. Utah Code Ann. 78-15-6 reads:
In any action for damages for personal injury, death, or property damage
allegedly caused by a defect in a product:
-19-

(1)

No product shall be considered to have a defect or to be in a
defective condition, unless at the time the product was sold by
the manufacturer or other initial seller, there was a defect or
defective condition in the product which made the product
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.

(2)

As used in this act, "unreasonably dangerous" means that the
product was dangerous to an extent beyond which would be
contemplated by the ordinary and prudent buyer, consumer or
user of that product in that community considering the
product's characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers and uses
together with any actual knowledge, training, or experience
possessed by that particular buyer, user or consumer.

(3)

There is a rebuttable presumption that a product is free from
any defect or defective condition where the alleged defect in
the plans or designs for the product or the methods and
techniques of manufacturing, inspecting and testing the
product were in conformity with government standards
established for that industry which were in existence at the
time the plans or designs for the product or the methods and
techniques of manufacturing, inspecting and testing the
product were adopted.

Utah Code Ann. 78-15-6.4 With respect to Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(1), the Dimicks
offered no evidence that at the time the home was sold by the manufacturer, Oakwood, to
Happy Homes, the home was unreasonably dangerous due to a manufacturing defect.
Instead, the Dimicks merely contended that Oakwood homes generally contain 30 to 50
pre-drilled holes for hooking up plumbing and electrical connections, and that these holes
acted as portals through which living creatures, including deer mice carrying hantavirus,
could enter Oakwood's manufactured homes. (R. 383). However, there is no evidence in

4

A copy of this statute is attached to the Brief of the Appellant as Addendum #2.
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the record to support this contention. While the Dimicks cited the deposition testimony of
John Schram for the proposition that the pre-drilled holes in Oakwood homes were
accessible to rodents, Mr. Schram's testimony does not offer such support. (R. 383-384).
Mr. Schram was employed by defendants Happy Homes and Lifestyle Homes to
set up manufactured homes on the sales lot upon receipt from the manufacturer. (R. 300,
350-351). When the home that was ultimately sold to the Dimicks was received by
Happy Homes, Mr. Schram assembled the home on the Happy Homes lot. (R. 300, 350351). Mr. Schram specifically testified that mobile home manufacturers generally caulk
or put expanding foam around the pipes and holes. (R. 468-469).5 He also testified that
the holes were not accessible to him once the home was assembled, and that pre-drilled
holes on the exterior of a home did not run through to the interior walls of a home. (R.
465-466, 469). Most importantly, Mr. Schram did not testify to any defects in the
Oakwood home that was sold to the Dimicks. (R. 350-351).
In short, the Dimicks have offered no evidence of any defect in the Oakwood
home that existed at the time of sale. Although they contend that pursuant to 24 C.F.R. §
3280.603(6) "All exterior openings around piping and equipment shall be sealed to resist
the entrance of rodents," they offer absolutely no evidence that the Oakwood home failed

5

There is no evidence in the record to support an inference that utility penetrations
in the Dimick home were unsealed or uncaulked. Mr. Schram did not testify that the
Dimick home had unsealed or uncovered penetrations nor did the Dimicks offer such
testimony. If they had, the Dimicks certainly would have cited such testimony in their
opposition to Oakwood's motion for summary judgment.
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to comply with this regulation.6 Mr. Schram's testimony certainly does not offer evidence
of non-compliance. To be sure, Mr. Schram testified that he observed no defects or
problems with the Dimick home. (R. 349-350). Instead, all evidence in the record
indicates that the home complied with all government standards. Specifically, the last
page of the "HUD Compliance Assurance Inspection Form" contains an entry requiring
that the home's "Bottom Board Sealed & Repaired to Prevent Rodent Access". (R. 383385). Both halves of the home complied with this requirement and therefore complied
with 24 C.F.R. § 3280.603(6). The Dimicks did not and have not offered any contrary
evidence.
With respect to Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(2), the Dimicks further failed to
establish that the alleged defect rendered the home "unreasonably dangerous" or
"dangerous to an extent beyond which would be contemplated by the ordinary and
prudent buyer, consumer, or user of that product in the community considering the
product's characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers, and uses . . . ." Utah Code Ann. §
78-15-6(2). Homes are living breathing structures with windows, doors, and various
other openings that allow for utility connections and venting. By their very nature, homes
are not hermetic. The Dimicks allegation that the alleged 30 to 50 penetrations in the
homes somehow constituted an "unreasonably dangerous" manufacturing defect ignores

6

A copy of 24 C.F.R. § 3280.603 is attached to the Brief of the Appellant as
Addendum #1.
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the very nature and characteristics of any home. The home was certainly not
"unreasonably dangerous" within the definition of Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(2) due to
penetrations that allowed for utility connections and venting.
Moreover, because Oakwood established that the home complied with government
standards for manufactured homes, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-15-6(3) there is a
rebuttable presumption that the home was free of defects. The Dimicks failed to offer any
evidence to rebut the statutory presumption, and the trial court properly granted summary
judgment in favor of Oakwood.
Utah case law further supports the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of Oakwood. In Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 418 (Ut. Ct. App.
1994), the Utah Court of Appeals applied Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6 to specific facts.
The court explained that "in order to prevail on a claim for strict products liability, the
plaintiff must meet a three-part test. The plaintiff must show (1) that the product was
unreasonably dangerous due to a defect or defective condition, (2) that the defect existed
at the time the product was sold, and (3) that the defective condition was a cause of the
plaintiffs injuries." Because the Dimicks produced no evidence of a defect or defective
condition in the home, they could not satisfy the first prong of the test. Furthermore,
because the Dimicks offered no evidence of a defect or defective condition, they failed to
satisfy the second and third prongs of the test.
The plaintiff in Burns. Burns, injured himself while riding his bicycle. He filed
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suit against the bicycle's manufacturer as well as the shop that sold him the bicycle
alleging breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, breach of certain express
warranties, products liability, and negligence. Id. at 417. Burns attempted to show that
the bicycle's braking system was defective and that the defective condition proximately
caused his injuries. Burns, however, was unable to produce any evidence establishing
that his bicycle in general or the braking system in particular were in any way defective.
While Burns alleged that his accident was caused when "the brake spring for the front
brakes of the bicycle popped off, causing the brakes to clamp down on the front of the
bicycle," Bums consulted with an expert that advised him that loss of the spring would
actually have an opposite effect and cause the brakes to release. Id. This conclusion was
shared by the defendants' experts. IcL
Because Bums lacked evidence of a defect in the bicycle, the defendants' filed a
motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion and Bums appealed.
The Utah Court of Appeals agreed that Burns failed to produce any evidence of a defect
in the bicycle or evidence that his injuries were caused by a defect of the bicycle and
affirmed the trial court. Id. at 418. Specifically, the court stated:
In sum, in order to defeat defendants' motion for summary judgment, Bums
must provide some evidence that a defect existed at the time he bought the
bicycle and that the defect caused his injury. It is not enough to merely
contend that a defect existed, show that an accident occurred, and assume
the two are necessarily related.
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Id. (emphasis in original).7
The Dimicks similarly failed to meet their burden. Specifically, they failed to
provide any evidence that a defect existed in the home and that the defect proximately
caused their alleged injuries. Instead, the Dimicks simply contended that a defect existed,
claimed that they were injured, and assumed the two were necessarily related. Under
Utah law, this was not sufficient to defeat Oakwood's motion for summary judgment and
the trial court properly granted judgment in favor of Oakwood.
II.

THE DIMICKS5 OBJECTIONS TO THE HUD CHECKLIST AND
THEIR CONTENTION THAT THE HOME DID NOT COMPLY
WITH HUD STANDARDS WERE NOT RAISED IN THE TRIAL
COURT AND WERE NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL.

In their appellate brief, the Dimicks for the first time argue that the
Oakwood home did not comply with standards promulgated by the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). Additionally, in their
appellate brief, the Dimicks for the first time raise objections to the "HUD Compliance
Assurance Inspection Form" that was attached as Exhibit 4 to Oakwood's Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. The Dimicks

7

Furthermore, under Burns, even assuming arguendo that the penetrations in the
home could be considered a "defect," the Dimicks still could not prevail on their claims
against Oakwood. There is no evidence in the record that a hantavirus infected rodent
entered the home through such a penetration as opposed to a door, window, or other such
entryway into the home. Because the element of proximate cause would be based solely
on speculation, the Dimicks' claims against Oakwood would fail as a matter of law.
Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 418 (Ut Ct. App. 1994).
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did not raise these arguments in their Memorandum in Opposition to Oakwood's Motion
for Summary Judgment, they did not assert them in the oral arguments on the motion for
summary judgment, and therefore they did not preserve the arguments for appellate
review. To be sure, the Dimicks' appellate brief does not cite to any portion of the record
to evidence that the arguments were preserved. By failing to raise the arguments below,
the Dimicks denied Oakwood the opportunity to address them, and denied the trial court
an opportunity to rule upon them. For this reason alone, the Dimicks' arguments should
be rejected by this Court and the trial court's summary judgment affirmed. See Cannon v.
Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc., 2005 UT App 352 fn 4; 121 P.3d 74 ("we do not
consider arguments for the first time on appeal that have not been properly preserved or
raised below"); Coombs v. Juice Works Development, Inc., 2003 UT App 388 fn 3; 81
P.3d 769 ("We will not address any new arguments raised for the first time on appeal.").
The Dimicks' new arguments may also be dismissed on substantive grounds. The
"HUD Compliance Assurance Inspection Form" was produced in the regular course of
discovery as one of the many business records Oakwood possessed with respect to the
design, manufacture, and sale of the home. The form is admissible evidence under Utah
R. Evid. 803(6) as a record kept in the ordinary course of Oakwood's regularly conducted
business activity.8
Next, the Dimicks mistakenly contend that the "HUD Compliance Assurance

8

Utah R. Evid. 803 is attached hereto as Addendum #2.
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Inspection Form" is inherently untrustworthy because it is silent on the issue of "rodent
resistance" and therefore contravenes 24 C.F.R. § 3280.603(b)(6). In fact the form does
address the issue with a line item that reads: "Bottom Board Sealed & Repaired to
Prevent Rodent Access." (R. 383-385). Upon inspection, the home was certified as
compliant with this requirement. (R. 329-337).
The Dimicks had ample opportunity to object to the HUD form in the trial court
proceedings. Indeed, they could have opposed Oakwood's motion for summary judgment
by filing a Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) motion for additional discovery in order to conduct
discovery with respect to the home's compliance with government standards.9
Alternatively, they could have requested the trial court hold an evidentiary hearing on the
HUD form. Instead, the Dimicks elected not to challenge the form and elected not to
dispute the home's compliance with government standards. Having failed to raise and
preserve these arguments in the trial court, the Dimicks should not be allowed to assert
them for the first time on appeal.
III.

OAKWOOD DID NOT RAISE NEW ISSUES IN ITS REPLY BRIEF
AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF OAKWOOD ON ALL OF PLAINTIFFS'
CLAIMS.

Oakwood's motion for summary judgment was comprehensive: the motion
requested judgment in Oakwood's favor on all claims asserted by plaintiffs against

9

A copy of Utah R. Civ. P. 56 is attached to the Brief of Appellant at Addendum

#3.
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Oakwood. (R. 291, 295). In accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c), the trial court
correctly granted Oakwood's motion because there were no genuine issues as to any
material fact and Oakwood was entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law.10 The
Dimicks5 initial complaint, First Amended Complaint, and Second Amended Complaint
named several defendants, including Oakwood. These complaints failed to set forth
specific causes action. (R. 001, 015, 171). Furthermore, the allegations of the complaints
were seemingly directed toward all defendants rather than specific parties.11
Nevertheless, after considerable discovery took place, including written discovery
requests and depositions of key witnesses, the Dimicks had produced no evidence of a
defect in the home purchased from co-defendant Happy Homes nor evidence that
Oakwood breached any duty allegedly owed the Dimicks. Accordingly, Oakwood filed a
motion for summary judgment on all of the Dimicks' claims. (R. 291).
Oakwood's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment stated: "Plaintiffs have not and cannot meet their burden of proof in

10

A copy of Utah R. Civ. P. 56 is attached to the Brief of Appellant at Addendum

#3.
11

On May 4, 2004, the Dimicks filed with the trial court an Application for Leave to
File a Third Amended Complaint together with a copy of a Third Amended Complaint.
(R. 222). Unlike the Dimicks' preceding complaints, this Third Amended Complaint
listed specific causes of action and the allegations identified specific parties rather than
generic "defendants." However, the Dimicks' Third Amended Complaint was not served
to Oakwood's counsel or counsel for any other defendant. (R. 225, 248). To be sure, the
Certificates of Service on the Dimicks' Application for Leave to File a Third Amended
Complaint and the Third Amended Complaint itself were not executed. (R.225, 248).
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order to state a viable claim against Oakwood. In order to prevail under a products
liability, breach of express or implied warranty, or negligence theory against Oakwood,
plaintiffs must provide some evidence of a manufacturing defect in the home." (R. 302).
Oakwood argued that because plaintiffs had produced no evidence of a defect in the
Oakwood home, and no evidence that their claimed injuries were proximately caused by
any defect in the home, all of their claims failed as a matter of law.
Despite the fact that Oakwood's motion for summary judgment addressed all
claims purportedly asserted by the Dimicks against Oakwood, the Dimicks nevertheless
stated in their opposing memorandum that Oakwood's motion for summary judgment
should be treated by the trial court as a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue
of strict products liability alone.12 The Dimicks then only opposed Oakwood's request for

12

Specifically, the Dimicks stated:

Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the Oakwood defendants' motion should
properly be styled as a motion for partial summary judgment, because it
seeks judgment only on Plaintiffs' strict products liability theory. Thus, the
Oakwood defendants do not seek judgment on the additional causes of
action alleged in the Third Amended Complaint — Breach of Implied
Warranty (Fitness), Breach of Warranty (Merchantability), Breach of
Express Warranty, Negligent Failure to Warn, and Premises Liability. This
opposition, then, will address only the strict products liability theory. If the
Oakwood defendants assert otherwise, Plaintiffs' respectfully request leave
to supplement this opposition.
(R. 380) (emphasis in original). It should be noted that the Dimicks here relied upon their
Third Amended Complaint which unlike their prior complaints actually stated specific
causes of action. However, the Dimicks never served Oakwood with a copy of the Third
Amended Complaint and therefore the claims as set forth in the Second Amended
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judgment on the strict products liability claim.
In its Reply Memorandum in Support of Oakwood's Motion for Summary
Judgment, Oakwood again asserted that there were no genuine issues as to any material
fact, and that Oakwood was entitled to judgment in its favor, as a matter of law, on all
claims asserted by the Dimicks. Again, Oakwood argued that because the Dimicks had
produced no evidence of any defect in the home and no evidence that Oakwood breached
any duty allegedly owed the Dimicks, all of the Dimicks' claims against Oakwood failed
as a matter of law. (R. 455-459). That Oakwood sought summary judgment on all of the
Dimicks' claims was abundantly clear to all parties.
Thereafter, even though the Dimicks were clearly aware that Oakwood sought
judgment on all of their claims and despite their having earlier requested leave of court to
supplement their opposition to Oakwood's motion, the Dimicks did not file a
supplemental brief in opposition to Oakwood's motion. On December 2, 2004, Oakwood
filed a "Notice to Submit for Decision" with the trial court. (R. 493). The Dimicks did
not file any objection to this notice. On February 2, 2005, the trial court scheduled oral
arguments on Oakwood's Motion for Summary Judgment for February 28, 2005. (R.
593). The Dimicks did not object to the scheduling of oral arguments and did not seek to
have them rescheduled in order to allow time for supplemental briefing. Instead, the

Complaint were at issue, not those asserted in the Third Amended Complaint. (R. 225,
248).
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Dimicks let the matter proceed forward and the trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of Oakwood on all of the Dimicks claims. In light of these facts, the Dimicks were
not unfairly prejudiced and were not precluded from marshaling evidence or making
argument on any warranty, failure to warn, or other theory.
The Dimicks' reliance on Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, 16 P.3d 540, for the
proposition that issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived and may not be
considered is entirely misplaced. The Brown case has no bearing in this matter for two
reasons: first, as set forth above, Oakwood did not raise new issues in its Reply
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, and second, the Utah Supreme Court's
statement that they will not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief
explicitly applies to appellate briefs filed with the Utah Supreme Court rather than
memoranda filed at the trial court level. Specifically, the Utah Supreme Court cited Utah
R. App. P. 24 and stated "Generally, issues raised by an appellant in the reply brief that
were not presented in the opening brief are considered waived and will not be considered
by the appellate court." Id. at ^[23 (emphasis added).13 The Utah Supreme Court's
statement therefore applies to specifically to appellate briefs and not trial briefs.
The record is clear: Oakwood did not raise new issues in its reply brief, the

13

Utah R. Civ. P. 24 specifically limits the issues that may be addressed in an
appellant's reply brief: "Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matters set
forth in the opposing brief." Utah R. Civ. P. 24(c). A copy of Rule 24 is attached hereto
as Addendum #3.
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Dimicks had ample opportunity to oppose Oakwood's motion for summary judgment, and
the Dimicks were not unfairly prejudiced. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted
summary judgment in favor of Oakwood on all of the Dimicks' claims.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CERTIFIED THE JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF OAKWOOD AS FINAL PURSUANT TO UTAH R.
CIV. P. 54(b) BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT COMPLETELY
DISPOSED OF OAKWOOD AS A PARTY.

The trial court's judgment in favor of Oakwood on all of the Dimicks claims
completely disposed of Oakwood as a party; however, the Dimicks' claims against the
remaining defendants remained intact. Accordingly, the trial court certified the judgment
in favor of Oakwood as final pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). Rule 54(b) permits a trial
court to "direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the
claims or parties" in a matter involving either multiple claims or multiple parties. Utah R.
Civ. P. 54(b).14 The effect of directing a final judgment for a partial disposition of a case
is to make the specified final judgment immediately appealable, although the remainder
of the case goes forward in the trial court. See Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 814P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1991).
The Dimicks contention that the trial court erred in certifying as final the judgment
in favor of Oakwood due to the existence of overlapping claims ignores the text of Utah
R. Civ. P. 54(b) and Utah case law. Rule 54(b) specifically allows the trial court to

14

A copy of Utah R. Civ. P. 54 is attached to the Brief of Appellant as Addendum

#6.
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certify as a final a judgment that completely disposes of a party, regardless of whether
multiple claims remain pending before the trial court. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). To be sure,
the rule states:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action . . . and/or
when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties, only
upon an express determination by the court that there is no just reason for
delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.
Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, in Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765,767
(Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court set forth three requirements that must be met for
proper Rule 54(b) certification:
First, there must be multiple claims for relief or multiple parties to the
action. Second, the judgment appealed from must have been entered on an
order that would be appealable but for the fact that other claims ur parties
remain in the action. Third, the trial court, in its discretion, must make a
determination that "there is no just reason for delay" of the appeal.
These requirements are clearly satisfied here. First, the Dimicks asserted multiple claims
for relief against multiple parties. Second, the judgment in favor of Oakwood would have
been immediately appealable but for the fact that other parties remained in the action.
Third, the trial court determined that there was no just reason for delay of the appeal. (R.
621, 644). The trial court's decision therefore complied with both Rule 54(b) and Pate.
The Dimicks' reliance on Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d
1099 (Utah 1991) is misplaced because it is clearly distinguishable from this case. The
issue in Kennecott was the standard for determining whether a particular lawsuit involved
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"separate claims" under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). In Kennecott a group of taxpayers sued
the State Tax Commission challenging a statute which imposed a levy to provide funds to
cover expenses incurred by counties in assessing property taxes. Id at p. 1100. The
taxpayers claimed the levy was invalid under three separate constitutional provisions. Id.
The taxpayers filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking judgment on one of
their constitutional claims. Id. The defendant tax collectors filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment for judgment asking the trial court to hold the levy constitutional on
all three constitutional grounds. Id The trial court denied the taxpayers motion and
partially granted the tax collectors' motion. Id Specifically, the court held that the
taxpayers lacked standing to assert one of their constitutional challenges to the levy. Id.
The court then certified the order as final pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), and the
taxpayers appealed that order. Id
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court raised the issue as to whether the trial court
properly certified the order as final pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). Specifically, the
Utah Supreme Court examined in detail "the finality requirements of separate claims
under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)." Id at p. 1102. The Utah Supreme Court then
adopted a standard for determining the finality of a separate claim under Rule 54(b). Id
at p. 1105.
The "multiple claims" standard adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in Kennecott
does not apply here because the trial court's Rule 54(b) certification in this case was
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premised upon the disposal of a party rather than a separate claim. As set forth above,
Rule 54(b) permits a trial court to "direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more
but fewer than all of the claims or parties" in a matter involving either multiple claims or
multiple parties. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) (emphasis added). So long as the order below
disposed of a party, the order was eligible for Rule 54(b) certification. Pate v. Marathon
Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1984).
Simply put, the trial court's certification complied with the requirements of Rule
54(b) and the decision should therefore be affirmed by this Court.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that Oakwood was entitled, as a matter of law, to judgment in its favor
on all of the Dimicks' claims. After two years of extensive discovery, the Dimicks failed
to produce any evidence of a defect in the Oakwood home that Christopher Dimick
purchased from Happy Homes. Accordingly, under Utah law, the Dimicks could not
sustain their claims against Oakwood. The trial court allowed the Dimicks a fair and full
opportunity to oppose Oakwood's motion for summary judgment, and their opposition
failed for lack of evidence of a defect in the home. The Dimicks' procedural and
evidentiary objections to the trial court's ruling are not supported by the record below and
do not alter the fact that the Dimicks failed to offer anything more than a bare allegations
against Oakwood. The trial court properly dismissed the Dimicks' claims against
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Oakwood as a matter of law. Because the judgment in favor of Oakwood disposed of
Oakwood as a party, after finding that there was no just cause for delay, the trial court
correctly certified the judgment as final. The trial court's judgment should therefore be
affirmed by this Court.
DATED this Z?

day of April, 2006.
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL

TERRY M. PLANT
•
H. JUSTIN HITT
Attorneys for Appellee OHC Liquidation Trust
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THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
REID DIMICK, individually and as the
personal representative of the Estate of
CATHLEEN DIMICK, CHRISTOPHER
DIMICK, KIRT DIMICK, JEREMY DIMICK,
BRYAN DIMICK, MATTHEW KLOEPFER
and BETTY JO KLOEPFER, heirs of the
Estate of CATHERINE ANN DIMICK,
Deceased; and CHRISTOPHER DIMICK,
individually,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, and CERTIFIED ORDER OF
FINAL JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 020700324

v.
ludge: Bruce K. Halliday
UNIVERSITY HOMES, INC., dba HAPPY
HOMES (HELPER) and dba HAPPY
HOMES VERNAL, a South Dakota
Corporation; MIKE HAAKINSON;
OAKWOOD MOBILE HOMES, INC., an
Indiana Corporation; OAKWOOD SHARED
SERVICES, LLC (a/k/a Schult Homes
Corporation), a Delaware Corporation;
SCHULT HOMES CORPORATION, a North
Carolina Corporation; HBOS
MANUFACTURING, LP (a/k/a Homes By
Oakwood, lnc.)(a/k/a Schult Homes
C-jfyuc"'- \ • JFESTYLE HOMES, a Utah
partnership, JOHN SCHRAM, ROBERT
HOGGATT, MARY MUSGRAVE, HEIDI
ESSEX and JOHN DOES l-X,

Defendants.

On February 28, 2005 the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by OHC Liquidation Trust
as successor in interest to defendants Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., Oakwood Shared
Services, LLC, Schult Homes Corporation, and HBOS Manufacturing, LP (collectively
"Oakwood") came before the Court for oral argument. The Court, having heard oral arguments,
having reviewed the motions and authorities cited therein, and being fully advised, enters the
following Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and resulting Order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court finds that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and specifically
finds as follows:
1.

On May 18,1998, Happy Homes ordered a manufactured home from Oakwood.

2.

Pursuant to Happy Homes' order, Oakwood manufactured a home (model

number 5828) bearing serial numbers 284627A and B (the "Home") for sale and delivery to
Happy Homes.
3.

On June 24, 1998, the Home was inspected by an inspector for the United States

Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Home met government standards as was
certified by the inspector as such by the affixation of Department of Housing and Urban
Development numbers 415130 and 415131 thereto.
4.

Happy Homes tendered payment for the Home and the Home was delivered to

Happy Homes' sales lot in June 1998.
5.

Prior to accepting delivery and possession of the Home, Happy Homes' agents

and employees inspected the Homp.
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6.

Happy Homes' agents and employees did not observe any problems with, defects

in, or defective conditions in the Home when Happy Homes received, inspected, and took
possession of the Home. The Home was ready for retail sale when received by Happy Homes.
7.

Happy Homes never notified Oakwood of any problems with, defects in, or

defective conditions of the Home.
8.

On March 11, 2000, Christopher Dimick toured the Home with his parents, Reid

and Cathy Dimick, and that same day contracted to buy the Home from Happy Homes.
9.

The Home sat on Happy Homes rural sales lot in Helper, Utah from June 1998

until the Home was delivered to Christopher Dimick's property on May 22, 2000.
10.

Happy Homes hired John Schram to assemble the Home on the Happy Homes

lot when it was received from Oakwood in 1998 and to disassemble the Home for transport to
the Dimick property in 2000. Mr. Schram did not observe any defects in or problems with the
Home on either occasion.
11.

Mary Musgrave worked as a sales agent for Happy Homes in Helper, Utah. Ms.

Musgrave showed the Home to prospective purchasers "countless" times between June 1998
and May 2000. Ms. Musgrave never observed any manufacturing defects in the Home and never
saw any evidence of mice in the Home.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court finds that there is no justification for holding the Oakwood defendants liable for
plaintiffs' alleged injuries and damages, and specifically concludes as follows:
Plaintiffs failed to rebut the Utah Code Ann. § 78-'«5-6W presumption hat xho
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Home was free from any defect or defective condition because the Home complied with
government standards relating to design, manufacture, and inspection of manufactured homes.
2.

Plaintiffs offered no evidence that the Home was unreasonably dangerous

due to a defect or defective condition, no evidence that a defect existed at the time the Home
was sold, and no evidence that a defective condition was the proximate cause of their alleged
injuries. Therefore plaintiffs' claims against Oakwood for strict products liability and breach of
warranty (merchantability) fail as a matter of law.
3.

There is no evidence of a defect or defective condition in the Home, a necessary

element of plaintiffs' claim against Oakwood for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, and therefore the claim fails as a matter of law.
4.

There is no evidence of any defect or defective condition in the home, and no

evidence that Oakwood breached any express warranty, and therefore the claim fails as a
matter of law.
5.

There is no evidence of a defect or defective condition in the Home, a necessary

element of plaintiffs' claim against Oakwood for negligent failure to warn, and therefore the claim
fails as a matter of law.
6.

There is no evidence that Oakwood had any ownership or possessory interest in

the Home after it had been sold and delivered to Happy Homes, and therefore Oakwood did not
owe any duty to plaintiffs as a premises owner. Additionally, there is no evidence of a defect,
defective condition, or unsafe condition in the Home that proximately caused plaintiffs' alleged
injuries. I- c^u < f h^so ar^ necessary elerc.

>f plaintiffs' premises liability claim against

Oakwood, the claim fails as a matter of law.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order
Dimick v. Oakwood, et al.
Civil No. 020700324
Page 4

ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT
^ased upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by OHC
Liquidation Trust as successor in interest to Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., Oakwood Shared
Services, LLC, Schult Homes Corporation, and HBOS Manufacturing, LP is granted. Judgment
is entered in favor of defendants Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., Oakwood Shared Services, LLC,
Schult Homes Corporation, and HBOS Manufacturing, LP and against plaintiffs on all claims
asserted by plaintiffs against these defendants in plaintiffs* Third Amended Complaint. All claims
against defendants Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., Oakwood Shared Services, LLC, Schult
Homes Corporation, and HBOS Manufacturing, LP are dismissed on the merits with prejudice.
In accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), the Court finds there is no just reason for delay
and directs entry of final judgmefrpn favor of the Oakwood defendants.

DATED t h i s ^ j j l f day of

<Z^2^<2

U^h^JJ/^j^^^b.

BY THE COURT

€^-

JUDGE BRUCE K. HALLIDAY
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Ah^rhL^.
BRADLEY LJ BOOKE
Attorney forPlaintiffs
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Tab 2

Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial.

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as
a witness:
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition
made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter.
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the declarant's
then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan,
motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation,
identification, or terms of declarant's will.
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements made for purposes
of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms,
pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof
insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a
witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify
fully and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was
fresh in the witness' memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the
memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit
unless offered by an adverse party.
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the
time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to
make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the
custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), Rules
902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the source of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this
paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every
kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (6).
Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, reports, records, or data compilations,
© 2006 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc , a member of the LexisNexis Group All rights reserved Use of this product is subject to the
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in any form, kept in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence
or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of information
or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any
form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B)
matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report,
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law
enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in
criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority
granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any form, of births, fetal
deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a public office pursuant to
requirements of law.
(10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a record, report, statement, or
data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which a
record, report, statement, or data compilation in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a
public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902, or
testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record, report, statement, or data
compilation, or entry.
(11) Records of religious organization. Statements of births, marriages, divorces, deaths,
legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or marriage, or other similar facts of personal or
family history, contained in a regularly kept record of a religious organization.
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of fact contained in a
certificate that the maker performed a marriage or other ceremony or administered a sacrament,
made by a clergyman, public official, or other person authorized by the rules or practices of a
religious organization or by law to perform the act certified, and purporting to have been issued
at the time of the act or within a reasonable time thereafter.
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family history contained in
family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on family portraits,
engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like.
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The record of a document
purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof of the content of the original
recorded document and its execution and delivery by each person by whom it purports to have
been executed, if the record is a record of a public office and an applicable statute authorizes the
recording of documents of that kind in that office.
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(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A statement contained in a
document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property if the matter stated was relevant
to the purpose of the document, unless dealings with the property since the document was made
have been inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document.
(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in existence twenty years or
more the authenticity of which is established.
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations, tabulations, lists,
directories, or other published compilations, generally used and relied upon by the public or by
persons in particular occupations.
(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon
cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct examination, statements
contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or
other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the
witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read
into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among members of a
person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a person's associates, or in the
community, concerning a person's birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy,
relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family
history.
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation in a community
arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs affecting lands in the community,
and reputation as to events of general history important to the community or State or nation in
which located.
(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character among associates or in the
community.
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or
upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a
crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to
sustain the judgment, but not including, when offered by the prosecution in a criminal
prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons other than the
accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility.
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or boundaries. Judgments as proof
of matters of personal, family or general history, or boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the
same would be provable by evidence of reputation.
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Tab 3

Rule 24. Briefs.

(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings
and in the order indicated:
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment
or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the
names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate page which appears
immediately inside the cover.
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references.
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations,
rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are
cited.
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard
of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial
court.
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out
verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation
alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under
paragraph (11) of this rule.
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case,
the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant
to the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e)
of this rule.
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a
succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a
mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged.
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant
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with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved
in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A
party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the
request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award.
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(a)(ll) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this
paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief
unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of
contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of:
(a)(ll)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited
in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(a)(ll)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in
all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as
part of a regularly published reporter service; and
(a)(ll)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions
of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or the contract or
document subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of
paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include:
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the
statement of the appellant; or
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the
appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the
appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the appellant
to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new
matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the
requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs may be filed
except with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral
arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and
"appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or in the agency
proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the
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injured person," "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the original
record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or
proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of
published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of
each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately numbered
page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to
exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility
of which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the
evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected.
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50
pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of
contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions
of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph
(g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs.
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a
notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless
the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. The brief of the appellant shall not
exceed 50 pages in length. The brief of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and
arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the appellant and
shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The appellant shall then file a brief which contains an answer
to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appellee's response
to the issues raised in the appellant's opening brief. The appellant's second brief shall not exceed
25 pages in length. The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second brief, not to exceed 25
pages in length, which contains only a reply to the appellant's answers to the original issues
raised by the appellee/cross-appellant's first brief. The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive
of table of contents, table of authorities, and addenda and maybe exceeded only by permission of
the court. The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good cause shown.
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than
one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of
either may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of
the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(i) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to
the attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before
decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the
citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the
page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall
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without argument state the reasons for the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made
within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited.
(j) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with
accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant,
immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or
stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the
offending lawyer.

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as
a witness:
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition
made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter.
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the declarant's
then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan,
motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation,
identification, or terms of declarant's will.
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements made for purposes
of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms,
pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof
insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a
witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify
fully and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was
fresh in the witness' memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the
memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit
unless offered by an adverse party.
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the
time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to
make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the
custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), Rules
902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the source of information or the method or
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circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this
paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every
kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (6).
Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, reports, records, or data compilations,
in any form, kept in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence
or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of information
or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any
form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B)
matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report,
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law
enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in
criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority
granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any form, of births, fetal
deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a public office pursuant to
requirements of law.
(10) Absence ofpublic record or entry. To prove the absence of a record, report, statement, or
data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which a
record, report, statement, or data compilation in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a
public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902, or
testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record, report, statement, or data
compilation, or entry.
(11) Records of religious organization. Statements of births, marriages, divorces, deaths,
legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or marriage, or other similar facts of personal or
family history, contained in a regularly kept record of a religious organization.
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of fact contained in a
certificate that the maker performed a marriage or other ceremony or administered a sacrament,
made by a clergyman, public official, or other person authorized by the rules or practices of a
religious organization or by law to perform the act certified, and purporting to have been issued
at the time of the act or within a reasonable time thereafter.
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family history contained in
family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on family portraits,
engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like.
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(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The record of a document
purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof of the content of the original
recorded document and its execution and delivery by each person by whom it purports to have
been executed, if the record is a record of a public office and an applicable statute authorizes the
recording of documents of that kind in that office.
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A statement contained in a
document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property if the matter stated was relevant
to the purpose of the document, unless dealings with the property since the document was made
have been inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document.
(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in existence twenty years or
more the authenticity of which is established.
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations, tabulations, lists,,
directories, or other published compilations, generally used and relied upon by the public or by
persons in particular occupations.
(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon
cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct examination, statements
contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or
other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the
witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements maybe read
into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among members of a
person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a person's associates, or in the
community, concerning a person's birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy,
relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family
history.
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation in a community
arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs affecting lands in the community,
and reputation as to events of general history important to the community or State or nation in
which located.
(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character among associates or in the
community.
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or
upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a
crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to
sustain the judgment, but not including, when offered by the prosecution in a criminal
prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons other than the
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accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility.
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or boundaries. Judgments as proof
of matters of personal, family or general history, or boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the
same would be provable by evidence of reputation.
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